By Alexander Luyima, GDipICL | The Hoima Post
When a court overturns one election because electoral irregularities are considered substantial, then upholds another despite acknowledging serious irregularities in the electoral process, the public is entitled to ask a difficult question: Is the law being applied consistently, and can the difference in judicial reasoning be convincingly explained?
That question now confronts Uganda’s electoral justice system following two decisions by High Court Judge Justice Bernard Namanya.
In May 2025, in Nambi Faridah Kigongo v Luyimbazi Elias Nalukoola and Electoral Commission, the judge annulled the election of Elias Nalukoola as Kawempe Division North Member of Parliament, citing the disenfranchisement of 16,640 registered voters across 14 polling stations and the candidate’s prohibited campaigning on polling day.
On October 21, 2026, in Nalubowa Rose v Nameere Justine and Others, the same judge dismissed Rose Nalubowa’s petition challenging a court ordered recount that had declared Justine Nameere the winner of the Masaka City Woman MP contest.
The judge acknowledged that the recount had been conducted in violation of electoral law and that the integrity of several electoral materials had been compromised. Nevertheless, he concluded that the petitioner had failed to prove that the irregularities substantially affected the election result.
Both judgments raise legitimate questions about electoral compliance. The critical issue is whether the judge applied a consistent legal standard when determining what constitutes substantial non-compliance capable of invalidating an election.
2025: When 16,640 Registered Voters Mattered
In Nambi Faridah Kigongo v Luyimbazi Elias Nalukoola and Electoral Commission, Election Petition No. 1 of 2025, reported as [2025] UGHCCD 58, Justice Namanya set aside Nalukoola’s election, declared the seat vacant and ordered a fresh election. Each party was directed to bear its own costs.
The court found that violence had disrupted electoral processes at 14 polling stations and that the Electoral Commission failed to count, declare and tally results from those stations, affecting 16,640 registered voters.
The court considered this failure alongside the finding concerning prohibited campaigning by Nalukoola on polling day.
The declared results gave Nalukoola 17,939 votes against Faridah Nambi Kigongo’s 9,058, a winning margin of 8,881 votes.
The judge reasoned that the exclusion of the 14 polling stations had the potential to affect the election result substantially. The number of registered voters excluded was sufficiently large to put the declared victory in doubt.
The distinction matters. The figure of 16,640 represented registered voters who were disenfranchised, not 16,640 confirmed votes that had actually been cast and counted.
The court did not have to establish that every affected voter would have participated or voted for the petitioner. The central question was whether the scale of the disenfranchisement and the circumstances surrounding the omitted results substantially affected the election.
This was a consequential interpretation of electoral fairness. It recognised that an election cannot always be judged exclusively by the votes appearing in the final tally when the process itself has excluded a substantial number of eligible voters.
The judgment ultimately resulted in Nalukoola’s election being annulled.
2026: When Irregularities Were Found but the Result Was Upheld
The decision in Nalubowa Rose v Nameere Justine and Others, Election Petition No. 5 of 2026, reported as [2026] UGHC 1325, presents a different outcome.
In this case, the court identified serious irregularities in a court ordered recount. These included compromised ballot boxes, missing or inconsistent contents, failures in safeguarding electoral materials and the exclusion of nine polling stations rather than the rejection of individual invalid ballots.
The judgment acknowledged that the recount had been conducted in non-compliance with electoral law.
Yet Justice Namanya dismissed Nalubowa’s petition, holding that she had not proved that the irregularities substantially affected the result. The certificate declaring Nameere the winner following the recount therefore remained in force, and costs were awarded to the respondents.
The key question lies in the court’s assessment of the electoral numbers.
According to the figures presented in this comparison, the nine excluded polling stations represented approximately 3,886 registered voters, while the reported number of votes cast was about 1,353.
The judge’s reasoning focused on the actual votes cast. Even if all 1,353 votes were hypothetically allocated to Nalubowa, the argument went, she would still fall approximately 973 votes short of Nameere’s total.
On that numerical basis, the petitioner failed to establish that the irregularities substantially affected the result.
But this is precisely where the comparison demands closer scrutiny.
If the 3,886 registered voters associated with the excluded polling stations are used as the starting point, that number exceeds Nameere’s reported winning margin of 2,326 votes.
This does not automatically establish that Nalubowa should have won. Registered voters are not the same as ballots cast, and an excluded polling station does not necessarily mean every registered voter was prevented from voting. Nor does the size of the registered electorate alone prove that the declared result was wrong.
Nevertheless, the figures raise a legitimate question: Why was the potential effect of disenfranchisement central to the assessment in the Nalukoola case, while the 2026 decision focused on the number of votes actually cast when evaluating the effect of irregularities?
The answer matters because the two approaches can produce radically different outcomes.
The Substantiality Test: Consistency or Distinction?
Section 80 of Uganda’s Parliamentary Elections Act provides the statutory framework for challenging parliamentary election results, including the requirement to establish that relevant non-compliance affected the result in a substantial manner.
The law does not necessarily require every election petition to be decided using identical arithmetic. The nature of the irregularity, the evidence presented, the reliability of the available records and the connection between the breach and the declared result may differ significantly from one case to another.
That is the strongest possible legal distinction between the two decisions.
In the Nalukoola case, the complaint concerned the failure to count and tally results from polling stations disrupted by violence. In the Nameere case, the dispute concerned the integrity and outcome of a recount, including the reliability of electoral materials and the treatment of polling station results.
These are not identical factual circumstances. A judge may legitimately reach different conclusions where the evidence and legal issues differ.
However, that distinction does not remove the need for transparent and consistent reasoning.
The public deserves to understand how a court determines the substantial effect of electoral irregularities when registered voters, actual ballots, missing results and compromised electoral materials are involved.
If potential disenfranchisement can put an election result in doubt in one case, what precise evidential threshold must be met before comparable concerns can affect the outcome of another?
If the court considers actual votes cast more reliable than registered voter totals in a recount dispute, should that approach also inform cases involving omitted polling station results? If not, what legal principle justifies the difference?
These are questions of judicial reasoning, not merely political disagreement.
The issue is not whether every irregularity must invalidate an election. Clearly, that would be an untenable position. The issue is whether courts explain why particular irregularities cross the statutory threshold in one case but fail to do so in another.
When Different Outcomes Create a Crisis of Confidence
Courts must remain independent of political pressure. They must also be able to explain their decisions in ways that demonstrate fidelity to the law, regardless of the candidates or political parties involved.
An election petition is not simply a contest between two politicians. It concerns the rights of voters, the credibility of electoral institutions and the public’s confidence that the declared result reflects a lawful process.
When irregularities are acknowledged but an election result is upheld, the reasoning must be sufficiently clear to explain why those irregularities do not meet the statutory threshold.
Likewise, when an election is annulled because voters were disenfranchised, the court must explain why the nature and scale of the exclusion undermine the declared outcome.
Without that clarity, the public is left to reconcile apparently different approaches on its own.
That is particularly troubling in an environment where political competition is already highly contested and public confidence in electoral institutions is fragile.
The concern is not that two different outcomes necessarily prove judicial bias. They do not. Nor is there sufficient evidence from these two decisions alone to establish that Justice Namanya acted for partisan reasons.
The concern is that an apparent difference in the application of a fundamental electoral principle requires a convincing legal explanation.
Judicial independence protects judges from political interference. It does not place their reasoning beyond public scrutiny.
Conclusion: The Law Must Be Consistent, Not Convenient
Uganda’s electoral justice system cannot command public confidence merely by announcing winners, dismissing petitions or nullifying elections. Its legitimacy also depends on whether the legal principles behind those decisions are applied transparently and consistently.
Justice Namanya’s 2025 Nalukoola judgment treated the disenfranchisement of 16,640 registered voters as a substantial factor in invalidating an election. His 2026 Nameere judgment acknowledged electoral irregularities but found that the petitioner had not demonstrated a substantial effect on the result.
There may be legally defensible reasons for that difference. Establishing whether those reasons adequately explain the contrasting outcomes requires careful examination of the full judgments, the evidence and the applicable statutory test.
But the central question remains unavoidable:
What precise legal principle explains why electoral irregularities sufficient to overturn one election did not justify overturning the other?
That question deserves a reasoned answer, not political defensiveness or dismissal of public concern.
If the distinction is legally sound, the court’s reasoning should withstand scrutiny. If the approach to substantiality has shifted, that shift deserves examination and clarification.
The stakes extend beyond Nalukoola, Nameere, Nambi and Nalubowa. They concern every Ugandan voter who expects the same law to apply regardless of political affiliation, personal influence or the identity of the candidate who benefits from the outcome.
Justice must not only be done. In electoral disputes, the reasoning behind it must also be clear enough for the public to understand why it was done.
For when citizens begin to suspect that the legal standard changes with the political circumstances, the damage extends beyond a single election. It reaches the credibility of the courts themselves.
The Hoima Post believes that the comparison between these judgments warrants serious legal scrutiny. The question is not whether a particular candidate deserves to win, but whether electoral law is being interpreted and applied according to consistent, transparent and defensible principles.
Alexander Luyima, GDipICL
The Hoima Post
